Read Bernanke's Testimony

Federal Reserve Policy

The Federal Reserve's response to the financial crisis and the recession has involved several components. First, in response to the periods of intense illiquidity and dysfunction in financial markets that characterized the crisis, the Federal Reserve undertook a range of measures and set up emergency programs designed to provide liquidity to financial institutions and markets in the form of fully secured, mostly short-term loans. Over time, these programs helped to stem the panic and to restore normal functioning in a number of key financial markets, supporting the flow of credit to the economy. As financial markets stabilized, the Federal Reserve shut down most of these programs during the first half of this year and took steps to normalize the terms on which it lends to depository institutions. The only such programs currently open to provide new liquidity are the recently reestablished dollar liquidity swap lines with major central banks that I noted earlier. Importantly, our broad-based programs achieved their intended purposes with no loss to taxpayers. All of the loans extended through the multiborrower facilities that have come due have been repaid in full, with interest. In addition, the Board does not expect the Federal Reserve to incur a net loss on any of the secured loans provided during the crisis to help prevent the disorderly failure of systemically significant financial institutions.

A second major component of the Federal Reserve's response to the financial crisis and recession has involved both standard and less conventional forms of monetary policy. Over the course of the crisis, the FOMC aggressively reduced its target for the federal funds rate to a range of 0 to 1/4 percent, which has been maintained since the end of 2008. And, as indicated in the statement released after the June meeting, the FOMC continues to anticipate that economic conditions—including low rates of resource utilization, subdued inflation trends, and stable inflation expectations—are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period.3

In addition to the very low federal funds rate, the FOMC has provided monetary policy stimulus through large-scale purchases of longer-term Treasury debt, federal agency debt, and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS). A range of evidence suggests that these purchases helped improve conditions in mortgage markets and other private credit markets and put downward pressure on longer-term private borrowing rates and spreads.

Compared with the period just before the financial crisis, the System's portfolio of domestic securities has increased from about $800 billion to $2 trillion and has shifted from consisting of 100 percent Treasury securities to having almost two-thirds of its investments in agency-related securities. In addition, the average maturity of the Treasury portfolio nearly doubled, from three and one-half years to almost seven years. The FOMC plans to return the System's portfolio to a more normal size and composition over the longer term, and the Committee has been discussing alternative approaches to accomplish that objective.

One approach is for the Committee to adjust its reinvestment policy—that is, its policy for handling repayments of principal on the securities—to gradually normalize the portfolio over time. Currently, repayments of principal from agency debt and MBS are not being reinvested, allowing the holdings of those securities to run off as the repayments are received. By contrast, the proceeds from maturing Treasury securities are being reinvested in new issues of Treasury securities with similar maturities. At some point, the Committee may want to shift its reinvestment of the proceeds from maturing Treasury securities to shorter-term issues, so as to gradually reduce the average maturity of our Treasury holdings toward pre-crisis levels, while leaving the aggregate value of those holdings unchanged. At this juncture, however, no decision to change reinvestment policy has been made.

A second way to normalize the size and composition of the Federal Reserve's securities portfolio would be to sell some holdings of agency debt and MBS. Selling agency securities, rather than simply letting them run off, would shrink the portfolio and return it to a composition of all Treasury securities more quickly. FOMC participants broadly agree that sales of agency-related securities should eventually be used as part of the strategy to normalize the portfolio. Such sales will be implemented in accordance with a framework communicated well in advance and will be conducted at a gradual pace. Because changes in the size and composition of the portfolio could affect financial conditions, however, any decisions regarding the commencement or pace of asset sales will be made in light of the Committee's evaluation of the outlook for employment and inflation.

As I noted earlier, the FOMC continues to anticipate that economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period. At some point, however, the Committee will need to begin to remove monetary policy accommodation to prevent the buildup of inflationary pressures. When that time comes, the Federal Reserve will act to increase short-term interest rates by raising the interest rate it pays on reserve balances that depository institutions hold at Federal Reserve Banks. To tighten the linkage between the interest rate paid on reserves and other short-term market interest rates, the Federal Reserve may also drain reserves from the banking system. Two tools for draining reserves from the system are being developed and tested and will be ready when needed. First, the Federal Reserve is putting in place the capacity to conduct large reverse repurchase agreements with an expanded set of counterparties. Second, the Federal Reserve has tested a term deposit facility, under which instruments similar to the certificates of deposit that banks offer their customers will be auctioned to depository institutions.

Of course, even as the Federal Reserve continues prudent planning for the ultimate withdrawal of extraordinary monetary policy accommodation, we also recognize that the economic outlook remains unusually uncertain. We will continue to carefully assess ongoing financial and economic developments, and we remain prepared to take further policy actions as needed to foster a return to full utilization of our nation's productive potential in a context of price stability.

Financial Reform Legislation

Last week, the Congress passed landmark legislation to reform the financial system and financial regulation, and the President signed the bill into law this morning. That legislation represents significant progress toward reducing the likelihood of future financial crises and strengthening the capacity of financial regulators to respond to risks that may emerge. Importantly, the legislation encourages an approach to supervision designed to foster the stability of the financial system as a whole as well as the safety and soundness of individual institutions. Within the Federal Reserve, we have already taken steps to strengthen our analysis and supervision of the financial system and systemically important financial firms in ways consistent with the new legislation. In particular, making full use of the Federal Reserve's broad expertise in economics, financial markets, payment systems, and bank supervision, we have significantly changed our supervisory framework to improve our consolidated supervision of large, complex bank holding companies, and we are enhancing the tools we use to monitor the financial sector and to identify potential systemic risks. In addition, the briefings prepared for meetings of the FOMC are now providing increased coverage and analysis of potential risks to the financial system, thus supporting the Federal Reserve's ability to make effective monetary policy and to enhance financial stability.

Much work remains to be done, both to implement through regulation the extensive provisions of the new legislation and to develop the macroprudential approach called for by the Congress. However, I believe that the legislation, together with stronger regulatory standards for bank capital and liquidity now being developed, will place our financial system on a sounder foundation and minimize the risk of a repetition of the devastating events of the past three years.

Thank you. I would be pleased to respond to your questions.