On top of that, there are specific building features that are red flags for security managers and insurers. For example, hotels with direct street access and those built on top of parking structures are considered high risk. (The issue in both cases is truck bombs.) In some situations, those features alone are enough to take a hotel or a convention center out of the running for security-sensitive events.
You would not think that a country-music festival would require the same kind of security planning as a meeting of the WTO ministers, and maybe it doesn't — but, increasingly, it requires something of the kind. That is not intended as a criticism of the organizers of the Las Vegas concert or of the authorities in Las Vegas; the usual standard in commercial law is that parties such as concert organizers or landlords have a responsibility to protect their customers from criminal acts that are "reasonably predictable." That means that if the locks on your apartment are broken, you complain to the landlord, he fails to fix them, and you get robbed, he's probably on the hook. Was the shooting in Las Vegas "reasonably predictable"? It would not have been 20 years ago. Today? What's "reasonably predictable" has been shifting for years, and the question of whether a tightly packed crowd is vulnerable to sniper fire is not obviously unreasonable — especially in a city already known to be an attractive target for terrorism. Consider how different the security arrangements would have been if it had been Donald Trump on that stage instead of Jason Aldean.
Concerns about terrorism and similar crimes already are incorporated into major commercial developments in the United States, affecting everything from obvious security issues to the design of buildings' environmental-control systems. In Asia and the Middle East, where new, sprawling urban developments have been under way since the 1990s and where terrorism may be more familiar, such considerations are implemented at the urban-planning and development level. That's harder to do in the United States and Europe, especially in older, built-up cities such as New York, London, or Paris. Most of the focus in this area, especially after the WTO riots in Seattle and elsewhere, has been on civic unrest, with firms such as Pinkerton developing specialized sub-practices dealing exclusively with that issue. Of course, mass-murderers with no obvious political agenda are by nature much more difficult to predict, and "lone wolves" acting independently of any network or organization do not have much in the way of communications to intercept or complex logistics to disrupt.
That isn't going to be an easy problem to get ahead of.
An open and liberal society will always have soft targets. But there are things we could be doing to make them harder. No, we don't want checking into a Las Vegas hotel or attending a country-music concert to be like getting on an airplane or visiting the Capitol. (On the other hand, my recollection is that the security screening before boxing matches at the Blue Horizon in Philadelphia was pretty comprehensive.) We might want to move large outdoor festivals to more defensible venues with more robust security. We probably should give some thought to Amtrak and the stations serving it.
Boring stuff? Sure. But better site selection and more intelligent security planning would be a lot more practical, a great deal less disruptive, and in the end almost certainly more effective than trying to seize the 357 million privately owned firearms in the United States, or even a substantial fraction of them. But like health care and economic growth, there is not going to be one big dramatic solution. If we're lucky, there will be 100 million little improvements. That's how real progress happens.
Commentary by Kevin Williamson, a roving correspondent at National Review. Follow him on Twitter @KevinNR.
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