What is perhaps surprising is that many of the practices that enabled investment banks like Lehman Brothers to mask their deteriorating finances during the crisis are still wide open — and still being employed by other banks.
Before it collapsed, Lehman crossed the line with a stratagem that enabled it to hide $50 billion, according to a report on the bankruptcy released earlier this year by a court-appointed examiner.
The big question is the extent to which other major banks used, and still use, creative financing techniques, and whether they, like Lehman, broke any rules.
The Securities and Exchange Commission is examining the borrowing practices of nearly two dozen financial companies. It is unclear if the S.E.C. will turn up any wrongdoing.
But industry analysts say that, even now, many financial companies routinely obscure their assets and risks in their quarterly financial statements through a variety of practices.
“Do financial institutions window-dress? Yes,” said Brad Hintz, an analyst with Sanford C. Bernstein & Company, who was Lehman’s chief financial officer in the 1990s. “You have close client relationships that you deal with to bring your balance sheet up and down. Absolutely. That’s part of the process.” This wizardry is typically carried out in a variety of ways on a bank’s trading floor.
In what is known as “netting,” for instance, banks that swap similar shares with each other, or their clients, can avoid recording those assets on their financial statements.
Banks also routinely lend out shares that they own in return for cash, thus temporarily removing those shares from their books. Total-return swaps — part of a family of financial derivatives that played a role in fomenting the crisis — are used to achieve similar results.
The Jefferies Group, a midsize investment bank, has gone so far as to shift the timing of its own financial reports this year so that, for a price, it can open its balance sheet to other banks looking to massage their numbers, industry analysts said. A Jefferies spokesman declined to comment.
It’s all perfectly legal. But accounting experts say such transactions, which are kept off the books and thus rarely disclosed publicly, can carry risks that shareholders should know about. Financial trades are different from such deals that are struck between, say, manufacturers.
“The basic convention of offsetting made a lot more sense when it came to the exchange of goods and services,” said Tom Selling, publisher of The Accounting Onion, a Web site about accounting. “When you get to the future exchange of financial instruments, it’s a whole different story.”
The dangers — real and potential — of trying to keep certain assets off the books were made painfully clear during the mortgage collapse. Many bankers thought they had carefully hedged against the risks posed by mortgage investments with other, offsetting trades. Many of those hedges didn’t work. The parties on the other side of the bank deals are often other banks, hedge funds or firms set up simply to service banks’ borrowing needs. They may or may not have full knowledge of how the banks record the transactions on their books. Bear Stearns, which collapsed into the arms of JPMorgan Chase , will be front and center during the hearing on Wednesday and Thursday. Five former Bear executives, including the bank’s one-time leader, James E. Cayne, are scheduled to testify before the panel.
In his prepared testimony, Mr. Cayne, Bear’s former chief executive, says that the firm collapsed because Bear’s clients withdrew assets and its lending partners canceled those loans, which were known as repurchase agreements.
“The market’s loss of confidence, even though it was unjustified and irrational, became a self-fulfilling prophecy,” Mr. Cayne’s testimony says. Before they ran into trouble, both Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers created so-called shadow financial vehicles. In 2001, Bear Stearns publicized a vehicle that it set up for its clients called Liquid Funding. Around the time, Lehman forged a close relationship with a small firm called Hudson Castle, which helped Lehman finance itself.
Such shadow vehicles typically employ repurchase agreements. Repos are a common tool that enable banks to sell assets with the promise to buy them back later. For accountants, the question is whether such deals should be recorded as loans or sales. That decision affects a financial company’s leverage ratio, which is a measure that is important to credit ratings agencies and investors.
Major banks like JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs are examining how to use shadow vehicles to help them borrow money in the future. Such entities typically issue short-term I.O.U.’s to investors, and then use the proceeds to make loans to banks. One firm that has created such vehicles to lend to banks in the past is BSN Capital Partners, a firm in London.
For the S.E.C., the financial inquiry commission and, ultimately, investors, the question is whether such deals are transparent.
Window-dressing is so pervasive on Wall Street that some analysts said they have tools to pinpoint how much in assets investment banks are hiding.
Mr. Hintz of Sanford C. Bernstein compares the interest rate expense that firms pay with their assets to see if their interest payments indicate that they often have higher assets during their quarters than they list at quarter-end, he said. Susan G. Markel, a former chief accountant in the enforcement division of the S.E.C., said Lehman’s suspicious repo transaction had put the focus on other firms.
“Obviously, as these come to light, it makes you wonder what was really out there,” Ms. Markel said.